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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Another ideological father speaks…. 
There have been many claimants to the seat behind the throne over the years: 
Burbulis, Shakhrai, Skokov, Filatov, Korzhakov, Pavlovsky and Voloshin or 
Sechin and Ivanov. One name stands out however, both for his longevity in the 
shifting circles of power and for his pretense to the mantle of defender of 
democracy. His name is nearly synonymous with Russian privatization, from his 
appointment as Head of the State Property Committee in the time of the 'Young 
Turks' to his stewardship of the 'Loans for shares' program to the post of Chief of 
Staff for a 'colossally fatigued' Head of State, Anatoli Chubais, in the Putin 
regime, has taken on the chimera of privatization of Russian utilities, in the guise 
of heading up Russia's UES. In Chubais' hands, UES may manage to implement, 
perhaps more effectively than any military or demographic subterfuge, the 
tightest reweaving of the states of the Former Soviet Union since the weft was 
rent in the Belovezhskaya Pushcha. 
 
The Russian energy supplier has recently moved to expand its hegemony over 
southern states of the FSU, notably Georgia and Armenia. (See N.I.S. Observed, 
Caucasus, 10 and 24 Sep 03) Chubais and this new tack have been lauded by 
his fellow 'reformers' and political party compatriots as potentially potent unifying 
forces. As Boris Nemtsov noted, certainly with the upcoming elections in mind, " 
[T]he Georgian electricity generation system has been purchased, and 
apparently others across post-Soviet territory will be purchased as well. Chubais, 
who is called the destroyer of the nation, has actually turned out to be its 
integrator." (YEZHENEDELNYI ZHURNAL, 8 Sep 03; What the Papers Say, 15 
Sep 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
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Chubais as integrator seems a stretch, although admittedly, he has had a 
remarkably tough row to hoe in his chosen path. He fought for the sale of state-
owned property when private property was still a disreputable proposition in most 
quarters; he dealt with the most vicious of the nascent oligarchs in the share 
auctions, only to find they were "stealing everything." He fought the combined will 
of the Heads of the Security Services and the Kremlin Guards as well as the 
dreaded presidential tennis instructor to 'protect' democratic choice through 
elections in 1996. But he did manage to enjoy unprecedented access to the 
White House and the Clinton administration's policy makers, a guaranteed rapt 
forum annually at Davos, and to wield the power of the Presidency for an ailing 
Yel'tsin following the 1996 election. After this roller coaster ride of a career, 
where has Chubais finally alit, ideologically? 
 
Liberal Imperialism 
According to Chubais, the end of the 20th Century was a time for Russia to face 
some hard facts: "The fight with the West has ended. They pushed us off the 
pedestal, we were falling from a great height for a long time, we tumbled down 
and almost broke our spines." (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 1 Oct 03; What the 
Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Now, proposes Chubais, "I think it is high time for us to call a spade a spade. 
Russia is the sole and unique leader in the CIS regarding the size of its economy 
and the standard of living of its citizens." (Ibid.) 
 
"Liberal imperialism must become Russia's ideology, and the creation of a liberal 
empire must become Russia's mission. (…) I understand that the word "empire" 
was a swear-word in the 1980s and 1990s. (…) It was impossible to use this 
word together with such notions as "civilization," "democracy," "market," and 
"freedom." It was impossible in the 20th century. However, the 20th century has 
ended. Everywhere and forever." (Ibid.) 
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The main criteria of Chubais' definition of "liberal imperialism" include a 
determination not "to challenge the respect for territorial integrity of neighboring 
states;" and conducting inter-state relations within the bounds of international 
law; with the possible benefits of the protection of Russian minorities (and 
Russian speakers generally) in neighboring states, expanding business 
opportunities and "protecting democracy." 
 
Chubais' Weltanschauung recognizes the limits of European integration for 
Russia: "[W]e do not need to join NATO or the European Union. Russia is too big 
for these structures from the economic, political and geographic points of view." 
What Anatoli Borisovich sees is a "strategic ring of great democracies" 
comprising "the U.S., united Europe, Japan and the Russian liberal empire." 
(Ibid.) 
 
While Chubais' message is replete with campaign rhetoric on the need for social, 
military, and, of course, economic reform, the tract also has the feel of a well-
pondered position paper. Leave it to Chubais to hit upon such a remarkable mix 
of Derzhava rhetoric blended with liberal-democratic sentiment just before the 
parliamentary (and presidential) elections. The problem with Chubais is that he 
won't leave the words to float in the air like a trial balloon. We know that at his 
direction, UES is acting on these principles already. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
FSB to monitor cell phone networks. 
In the past two weeks, disturbing reports have indicated that the Federal Security 
Service may have begun to monitor cell phone conversations and SMS 
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messages in the Greater Moscow region, including the city itself. (WHAT THE 
PAPERS SAY (WPS) 30 Sept 03 via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
According to various sources, the FSB has created a "watch-list" of words and 
phrases, including "Putin," "Bomb," "Drug," and "Shakhid," which will raise red-
flags, and lead to further investigation. (WPS-Russian Political Monitor, 1 Sept 03 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Rossiya TV reported (WWW.RUTV.RU, 24 
Sept 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0925 via World News Connection) that "suspect 
messages will be entered into a database compiled by cell phone operators and 
handed over to special services agents." If taken at face value, these reports 
would seem to indicate that there are no safeguards to prevent serious potential 
abuses of the eavesdropping system. 
 
Perhaps in anticipation of a negative reaction, and deep concern on the part of 
cell phone users, providers have been quick to respond: VympelKom, a leading 
provider, issued a statement by its Head of Public Relations, Mikhail Uvarov, 
stating that "every GSM Operator has a server where all messages are 
processed. Whenever necessary, the operator can trace any SMS message and 
its sender." Uvarov added the caveat that a court warrant would be required 
before any record could be passed on to the Security Services. (WPS, 30 Sept 
03 via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
In support of this statement FSB spokesman Sergei Ignatchenko, emphasized 
that the Security Services would need to "provide evidence of criminal activities 
by the suspect," before gaining "access to private communications." (WPS, 30 
Sept 03 via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Two important details must be noted when assessing this explanation. First, the 
FSB does not have an impeccable record in terms of civil liberties and presenting 
evidence of criminal activity before making arrests; secondly, legislation passed 
as a result of the Moscow Theater siege, the suicide bombings in Tushino, and 
 5 
the more recent attacks in Mozdok and Chechnya already allows the FSB 
"access to all cell phones in Moscow and the Moscow region." (WPS 30 Sept 03 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Interior Minster Boris Gryzlov's statement in August (see NIS Observed, 12 
September 2003), that legislation to enhance the authority of the Security 
Services would be forthcoming has proven remarkably prophetic. Upon which 
area of private citizens’ lives will the FSB next intrude? 
 
New counter-terrorism unit begins operations 
A new undercover anti-terrorist unit has begun operations in Russia. Established 
as part of the MVD, the "T" Center’s task is to "combat terrorism, extremism, and 
abduction." (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 24 Sept 03, FBIS-SOV-2003-0928 via 
World News Connection) 
 
According to an interview conducted with its chief, Yuri Demidov, the counter-
terrorism body was created on the orders of MVD Chief Boris Gryzlov, and is 
supposedly one of the most covert entities of the Russian state security 
apparatus. 
 
Demidov stated that the unit would specialize in carrying out investigations of 
terrorist acts, and that it would be working "in close contact" with its "colleagues 
at the Lubyanka." (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 24 Sept 03, FBIS-SOV-2003-0928 
via World News Connection) 
 
On the face of it, there seems to be little positive purpose in creating the new 
entity. If the FSB’s rumored takeover of the MVD is proven correct, then the only 
conclusion to be drawn is that the "T" Center will take much of the flak for failing 
to prevent any future terror attacks, leaving Putin’s beloved FSB itself with an 
"unblemished" record. On the other hand, if the MVD is still operating 
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independently, then the new unit represents merely the replication of authority by 
yet another body with unfettered powers to infringe citizens’ rights. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Dullea 
 
Kyoto: What does Russia fear? 
Finally, Russia has a chance to take a leadership role in an international arena in 
which the United States is not present. It has the opportunity also to improve its 
reputation among European Union members and the prospect of making some 
cash. So why is Russia hesitating to ratify the Kyoto protocol when it could bring 
such benefits? After all, doesn't Russia claim concern about the planet’s 
ecological well-being — as reflected in its recent postponement of a multi-billion 
dollar oil pipeline deal with China over "environmental concerns" in the Lake 
Baikal area? 
 
The participants of Kyoto, who maybe hoped that this was the case, were 
anxiously awaiting news at the 29 September — 3 October World Climate 
Change Conference in Moscow, that Russia indeed would ratify the protocol. 
Moscow’s participation is considered critical because Kyoto cannot enter into 
force until countries representing 55 percent of emissions have ratified it. Thus, 
Russia’s 17 percent share of emissions essentially gives Russia a veto over the 
environmental pact’s effectiveness. Last year Russian Prime Minister Mikhail 
Kasianov announced that Russia would ratify Kyoto in the "near future," but 
President Vladimir Putin's statements disappointed conference attendees and the 
protocol-supporting governments which were counting on Russia to take the 
necessary steps to make Kyoto a reality. 
 
In his speech at the conference Putin, less than tastefully, joked that perhaps 
global warming wasn’t such a bad thing since it might reduce the need to buy so 
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many fur coats. More seriously he expressed doubts about the science 
buttressing the claims that industrial pollution actually is the cause of global 
warming trends. Putin also left no doubt that the Russian economy was a part of 
his tendency to put aside the Kyoto agreement, calling for greater financial 
guarantees. 
 
At first glance it may appear that Kyoto could be a good deal for Moscow; since 
Russia’s greenhouse gas emissions have decreased from the 1997 levels upon 
which the protocol is based, Russian industry, for the near- to mid-term, would 
not have to make any expensive changes to meet the treaty requirements. Thus, 
Moscow could sell its quota credits to other countries that are exceeding their 
quotas. Estimates of potential annual profits for Russia from such sales range 
from the Russian Energy Ministry’s conservative $500 million to $4 billion to The 
Financial Times’ $10 billion calculations. (30 Sep 03 via Johnson's Russia List 
(JRL) #7345, 30 Sep 03) Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Gordeyev, 
however, stated that Russia is doubtful that there would necessarily be buyers for 
these credits, and that is why Moscow would insist on written guarantees before 
committing to the treaty. (DEUTSCHE WELLE, 29 Sep 03 via 
www.YubaNet.com, 30 Sep 03) 
 
The Kremlin, however, may also have other, less immediate, concerns in mind. 
With the U.S. no longer active in the Kyoto protocol, and China, as a developing 
country not yet affected by Kyoto’s requirements, Russia could in the long-term, 
find itself at a disadvantage against these two competitors. (ITAR-TASS, 30 Sep 
03 via JRL #7346, 1 Oct 03) Moreover, the Kremlin probably is concerned that 
Kyoto’s entry-into-force would drive down world energy prices by encouraging 
western countries to burn less fossil fuel. This could devastate Russia financially 
since, according to an August 2003 report from the World Bank, nearly half of 
Russia’s recent growth has been due simply to the rise in the price of oil. (THE 
TIMES, 25 Sep 03 via JRL #7337, 25 Sep 03) So, even after President Putin’s 
statements last week at the World Economic Forum in Moscow that Russia 
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would no longer rely solely on oil, (INTERFAX, 3 Oct 03 via JRL #7350, 3 Oct 03) 
concern about the way in which Kyoto could affect prices has trumped what may 
otherwise have been an economic and foreign relations coup for Russia. 
 
Although the pact isn’t dead yet, Putin refused to set a date for ratification, stating 
simply that Russia needs more time to study the plan. This has led to 
accusations that Moscow is abusing the power it has over Kyoto and is playing 
brinksmanship in order to gain leverage on the international scene, (THE 
FINANCIAL TIMES, 30 Sep 03 via JRL #7345, 30 Sep 03) including, perhaps, in 
regard to its pending entry to the World Trade Organization. Clearly, decision 
making in the Kremlin, whether regarding Iraq, Iran, Europe, relations with the 
U.S. or the world’s environmental status, continues to revolve around the effect 
each issue may have on Russia’s number one source of wealth: energy. Just as 
the environmental concerns holding up the oil deal with China may constitute a 
convenient cover for deciding on which of two pipeline options offers Russia the 
most profit, so, too, the stalling over Kyoto appears to be designed to ensure 
maximum earnings for Moscow’s expanding oil market. 
 
Russia and Poland launch new visa regime 
Individual Russian citizens now are affected directly by the consequences of 
having geographic neighbors that belong to the European Union (EU). Due to the 
EU’s requirements, Poland has begun to require visas for Russian travelers as of 
1 October 2003. The agreement between Moscow and Warsaw that was signed 
on 18 September 2003, means that Polish travelers to Russia now will also be 
required to have visas. That supplants the agreement on visa-free travel that had 
been in place since 1979 between the two former Warsaw Pact states. 
 
Generally, Russian officials are expressing understanding of the need for a visa 
regime, which is unavoidable for Poland as a new EU member. However, 
according to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Razov, neither side is 
enthusiastic about the change. (CHANNEL ONE TV MOSCOW, 1 Oct 03; BBC 
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Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database) On the other hand, the intent of 
the new agreement is to help Europe as a whole keep out the drugs and other 
criminal activities that transit from Asia through Russia and into Europe. On 1 
October, Poland also began similar visa regimes with its other non-EU neighbors: 
Ukraine and Belarus. 
 
Moscow and Warsaw had been discussing the new visa requirements for most of 
the year and initially planned to introduce the new regime on 1 June 2003. 
However, Poland delayed its introduction, reportedly due to the complications 
that could have arisen during the peak summer travel season. Additionally, it was 
suggested that Russia might not have been ready logistically to implement the 
new system. (PAP NEWS AGENCY, 16 June 03; BBC Monitoring via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
The cost for Russians to purchase visas to Poland is 10, 16 and 50 Euros (for 
single, double and multi-entry visas, respectively). Free visas for the elderly, 
children and some students, teachers and business people are available under 
the new arrangements, that provides also for visas free of charge to residents of 
Kaliningrad Oblast'. The agreement, being largely reciprocal, means that Poles 
desiring to travel to Kaliningrad also can obtain free visas. 
 
In all probability the most immediate victims of the visa requirements will be the 
Russian entrepreneurs in Kaliningrad known as shuttle traders who have been 
exploiting the loose border controls to market their goods in Poland where better 
profits are to be made. With the new visa system in place, border and customs 
controls are tighter, and shuttle traders who are caught transporting undeclared 
goods stand to lose their visas. Polish officials reacted unsympathetically to 
complaints on this score, and the Polish consul-general in Kaliningrad, Jaroslaw 
Czubinski, stated that these traders have had plenty of time to find new jobs. 
(NTV MIR, 30 Sep 03; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
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The latest measures come at a time of relatively stable relations between 
Moscow and Warsaw. In December 2002 the Russian Ambassador to Poland 
Nikolai Afonsievsky declared that relations between the two countries "are now 
better than they have ever been." (ENGLISH.PRAVDA.RU, 20 Dec 02) Despite 
opposing positions on the Iraq war, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Polish 
President Aleksandr Kwasniewski met on a Russian missile cruiser in the Baltic 
Sea during joint naval exercises. Kwasniewski expressed his belief that Poland’s 
accession to the EU was promising for economic and social improvements in 
Kaliningrad. Putin promised that a Russian natural gas pipeline project planned 
for the Baltic seabed would not alter plans for the Yamal pipeline branch that is to 
be constructed across Poland. 
 
Certainly, larger issues such as pipelines and energy sales outweigh the visa 
regime’s impact on the relatively small number of shuttle traders and other 
unfortunate individuals. That portion of Kaliningrad’s unofficial economy is 
dwarfed by Russia’s sales of energy to Poland which, according to the U.S. 
Department of Energy, obtains 54% of its natural gas and roughly 50% of its oil 
imports from the Russian Federation. This visa system is a necessary evil for 
Russia that comes with the reality of the European Union's expansion. Russia 
has to become accustomed to that reality since such requirements will remain in 
place until Russia becomes a member of the Schengen Agreements — unlikely 
in the foreseeable future due to the difficulty of controlling the vast Russian 
borders with its Asian neighbors. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Kate Martin 
 
MEDIA 
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The media and the oligarchs 
Ignoring the fact that the state, not private business, controls Russia’s media, 
President Vladmir Putin claimed the mantel of defender of the free press during a 
meeting at Columbia University in New York last month. He pointed to the 
dangers posed by his favorite piñata, the oligarchs, as the major threat to 
journalism. "If they (the media) are monopolized by two or three money bags, it 
would mean the protection of corporate interests instead of freedom of press," he 
said. (ITAR-TASS, 2155 GMT, 25 Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0926 via World News 
Connection) 
 
Given the state of the press in the Russian Federation, Putin’s comments warrant 
investigation. Who is left to pose any sort of political threat to his regime? Well, 
there’s one oligarch who hasn’t been co-opted, imprisoned or pushed to the 
margins of power: Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who managed to avoid the 
government’s prosecutorial blitz against YUKOS this summer, does not seem to 
be in the pro-Putin camp. Worse still, he’s talking publicly about his concerns. 
"[T]heoretically you have a free press, but in practice there is self-censorship. 
Theoretically you have courts; in practice the courts adopt decisions dictated 
from above. Theoretically there are civil rights enshrined in the constitution; in 
practice you are not able to exercise some of these rights," he warned. [THE 
TIMES (LONDON), 18 Sep 03 via Lexis-Nexis] However, the businessman was 
quick to point out that he blames not Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov nor Putin, 
but the security agencies, for the abrogation of rights. This is somewhat 
disingenuous, given that the latitude enjoyed by the security agencies did not fall 
like manna from heaven, but rather like manna from the Kremlin. Moreover, he’s 
putting his money where his mouth is, supporting the liberal/free market parties 
YABLOKO and Union of Right Forces. 
 
Government attempts to silence another noisy oligarch, Boris Berezovsky, have 
met with mixed success. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 24 Sep 03) Meanwhile, oligarch 
and one-time media mogul Vladimir Gusinsky still awaits an Athens Court of 
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Appeal decision regarding his possible extradition to Russia on charges of 
money-laundering. (ITAR-TASS, 1641 GMT, 25 Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0926 
via World News Connection) His case has been continued until mid-October as 
Greek authorities request additional information from Russia. Prosecutor Anna 
Zairi, recommending against the extradition request, noted that the fraud charges 
against Gusinsky were too vague. (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 29 Sep 03 via 
Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Clearly hoping to tap the oligarch baton to aid their own political endeavors, 
some parties are supporting Putin’s claims that society is in peril. Indeed, voters 
run the risk of being bludgeoned with the threat. Dmitri Rogozin, in explaining the 
goals of his recently formed electoral bloc with Sergei Glazyev, noted that a 
"narrow group of self-interested people have the economy in their hands and 
dictate to us how we should live. The oligarchs are our enemy." (Global News 
Wire, 14 Sep 03; World News Connection via Lexis-Nexis) Moreover, the 
recently formed bloc of the Social Justice Party and the Pensioners’ Party 
declared: "We will aid the president in the struggle against the oligarchs...." 
(ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 17 Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0917 via World News 
Connection) Well, the media would have been breathing a huge sigh of relief, if 
only the state hadn’t already pulled the plug on the respirator. 
 
REGIONS 
Not in our back yard, but maybe in yours 
While insinuating that states in which ethnic Russians reside should pay attention 
to demographics, authorities in Moscow and elsewhere in the Russian 
Federation are keeping a close eye on incoming migrants. It does not appear as 
though immigrants will be enjoying much support from the authorities. 
 
First Deputy Foreign Minister Eleonara Mitrofanova noted that, with more than 25 
million ethnic Russians living outside the Russian Federation, the community is 
second in size only to the Chinese diaspora. Attending the World Congress of the 
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Russian Press, she claimed that persecution of Russian speakers continues in 
Ukraine and the Baltic states (despite repeated rejections of such claims in the 
international arena). However, she did see cause for optimism. "The life of our 
compatriots abroad will be getting easier as long as Russia is getting stronger," 
she said. (ITAR-TASS, 1122 GMT, 20 Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0920 via World 
News Connection) 
 
Meanwhile, the lives of non-ethnic Russians are unlikely to improve within the 
confines of the Federation. According to Viktor Ozerov, chairman of the 
Federation Council’s committee on defense and security, the wave of migration 
into Russia is a major problem threatening both social stability and state security. 
(INTERFAX-AVN, 0902 GMT, 2 Oct 03 via Lexis-Nexis) Krasnodar Kray is one of 
the more popular destinations, it appears, a fact that does not thrill local 
authorities. 
 
Indeed, in the face of three 25 August bombings that killed 4 persons and injured 
20 others in Krasnodar, the kray administration has tightened its passport 
regime. Governor Aleksandr Tkachev denies media charges that the restrictions 
amount to a witch-hunt based on ethnicity. "The scoundrels who stirred up this 
bloody mess came to our kray from outside. We have declared war on illegal 
migration, which has always been a nutrient medium for crime. Honest people, 
those who came to Kuban with good intentions, have nothing to fear," he said. 
(ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 18 Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0918 via World News 
Connection) 
 
And yet, maybe they do have something to fear, since Tkachev seems intent on 
making the atmosphere in Krasnodar inhospitable even to legal migrants. 
Discounting allegations that he is "a xenophobe and a nationalist," he explains 
that he has to be wary. "The demographic situation is alarming. With every 
passing year, the size of the native population of Kuban-Russians, Adygey — is 
declining, and there are fewer Ukrainians and Belarussians. At the same time, 
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the number of Armenians has increased by 38 percent, of Kurds — by 85 
percent, or Assyrians — by 64 percent, and of Georgians — by 43 percent... If 
this situation continues, then in another 10 years the ethnic make-up of the kray 
will radically change, and with the slightest destabilization of the situation, Kuban 
may become another Chechnya," he said. (Ibid.) Two "main participants" in the 
series of bombings were arrested on 2 October, police said. (ITAR-TASS-1823 
GMT, 2 Oct 03 via Lexis-Nexis) No information concerning their identity or 
ethnicity was provided. 
 
Apparently, Tkachev has an ally in the Interior Ministry. Deputy Minister 
Aleksandr Chekalin, who heads the Federal Migration Service, warned the State 
Duma of the need to oversee all foreigners in the Russian Federation. 
Approximately 600,000 persons received work permits this year and last, he 
claimed. Another 10,000-16,000 were apprehended with false or incorrectly 
completed work documents, he said, adding that a single registration system is 
needed to exercise effective control over all foreigners in the country. The 
ministry already has begun to compile a database of foreigners. (ITAR-TASS, 
0835 GMT, 17 Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0917 via World News Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Kris Beasly and Paul Lyons 
 
There’s no place like home… 
Russia sees many security problems emanating from the south; thus, President 
Putin’s government is determined to create a better infrastructure to support 
major military and security forces in the southern positions of the country, 
especially between the Black and Caspian Seas. In fact, the President gathered 
a large number of military and political officials in the region earlier this month to 
discuss ways of strengthening Russia's positions on the Black Sea. In the wake 
of the meeting, on 22 September 03, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov 
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said, "[President Vladimir Putin] has signed a range of documents prepared by 
the Foreign Ministry, the FSB and the Defense Ministry aimed at creating a 
worthy military infrastructure in this important Russian region, which borders very 
explosive regions of the world." (KOMMERSANT, 22 Sep 03; What the Papers 
Say--Defense and Security via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
One key element of this campaign is a revitalized naval base on the Russian 
Black Sea coast to house the eastern section of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. 
When the USSR dissolved in 1991, Ukraine and Russia fought bitterly over the 
Black Sea Fleet. After much wrangling, they divided up the fleet and its personnel 
(Russia 82%, Ukraine 18%, Georgia 0%) and Ukraine signed an agreement to 
rent to Russia part of the naval base at Sevastopol for its portion of the divided 
fleet. The lease runs until 2017, and Russia plans on having it renewed, but it 
has begun also efforts to build a major new naval base at the port of 
Novorossiisk on the eastern littoral of the Black Sea (southwest of Krasnodar). 
On 4 October 2003, Black Sea Fleet Commander Vladimir Masorin announced, 
"Preliminary estimates indicate that the construction of the Black Sea Fleet naval 
base in Novorossiisk will be completed by 2010. Its cost will total approximately 
2-3 billion rubles." (INTERFAX, 29 Sep 2003 via gazeta.ru) Masorin noted that 
the first phase would serve to enlarge and enhance the facilities for the forces 
already assigned there, namely a brigade securing the sea district and marine 
and fleet aviation units of the Black Sea Fleet. The plan then envisions 
expanding the two existing piers and enhancing port defenses. However, 
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov stated "This does not mean that we 
intend to leave our main naval base in Sevastopol and withdraw the Black Sea 
Fleet to Novorossiisk. The main base of the Black Sea Fleet will remain in 
Sevastopol." (KOMMERSANT, Ibid.) Ivanov noted that the new base will be used 
for mooring the warships withdrawn to the Krasnodar region since 1991 (i.e. the 
Eastern squadron of the fleet). 
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Masorin also stated that, "Further development of the Black Sea Fleet on the 
Russian coast has been planned. A state target program will be adopted. It will 
be linked to the overall development of the Russian Navy," he said. "The Black 
Sea Fleet commanders hope that it will be an excellent base not only for the 
forces currently stationed there but for additional forces as well," he said. 
(INTERFAX, 29 Sep 2003; gazeta.ru via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
The bottom line: in addition to the modernized and expanded naval base, Russia 
intends to build a network of airbases, ports and military bases for the Armed 
Forces, to include the FSB’s newly reacquired Border Guard Service (THE 
HINDU, 29 Sep 03; The Financial Times via Lexis-Nexis). 
 
Speaking of getting booted from the neighborhood… 
Just as the breakup of the USSR created an (inequitable) division of the Black 
Sea Fleet and the need for new naval bases on the Black Sea, so too did it 
delete a key component of Russia's ballistic missile and space object tracking 
capability. General Anatoli Perminov, Commander of the Russian Space Troops, 
stated that the dismantling of the Skrunda radar in Latvia left a gap in the west 
and northwestern section of the electronic fence around Russia, facing the 
United Kingdom and the U.S. To fill that gap, the Russian Long-Range Radio 
Communication Research Institute, in one of their largest project of the last 10 
years, developed the "Volga" radar to replace the older, less capable system. 
 
On 2 October 03, Russian Space Troops began operational use of this new 
phased array radar, which was built near Baranovichi, Belarus (of note, the 
Space Troops attached great symbolic importance to achieving the first alert in 
time to celebrate the Russian "Day of the Space Troops," which is 2 October 
each year). Much like the "PAVED PAWS" system in the U.S., the primary 
mission of the new "Volga" radar is to detect and track incoming intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and their 
warheads, in the event of an attack. Additionally, the radar helps track and 
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catalog space objects both for collision avoidance reasons and for general space 
situational awareness (i.e. tracking Russian and foreign satellites). 
 
Although the system was first designed in the late 1980’s and construction begun 
more than a decade ago, lack of money forced the military to delay it. However, 
as economic conditions improved and more money was found for the defense 
budget, Russia was able to restart the project and insert updated technology. 
The finished system was first activated and placed in a test mode in December 
02 and has now completed all appropriate testing according to the public 
information service of the Russian Space Troops (an separate military service 
charged with ground-based ICBM launch and defense and with space launch 
and military space operations). Compared to the older system, the new modular 
radar can detect ICBMs in flight at greater distances and with more precision and 
can detect, identify and track space objects up to "several thousand kilometers" 
above earth. Major General Anatoli Shishkin, deputy commander of the Space 
Troops, and officer in charge of space missile defense functions, noted that this 
modular design will allow for easier future expansion in other directions, if 
needed (CHANNEL ONE TV, Moscow, 0800 GMT, 2 Oct 03; BBC Monitoring 
International Reports via Lexis-Nexis). 
 
As this system feeds the Russian missile detection and defense system, the data 
it provides may help reduce the possibilities of accidental nuclear war. As long as 
all major players with ICBMs/SLBMs have the ability to detect and verify 
launches with two independent means (called dual phenomenology in the U.S.), 
the odds of a software bug, mechanical problem or poor training triggering a false 
positive alert will diminish significantly. Like the U.S., Russia relies both on 
ground-radars and satellites. The Volga system will be able to cover almost 
5,000-kilometers including most of Europe, the Mediterranean and deep into the 
Atlantic and Arctic oceans. 
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Russian space analysts may share space tracking data with Russian and NASA 
personnel that constantly track space debris to prevent collisions between debris 
and manned vehicles, such as the Soyuz capsule, the Space shuttle (whenever it 
flies again), and the International Space Stations itself. (RIA-NOVOSTI; 
gazeta.ru, 3 Oct 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
He loves me; he loves me not 
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to disagree with the proposal that the 
U.S. has put forth regarding additional international help in Iraq. Twice in recent 
days, Mr. Putin, or senior members of his government, have compared Iraq with 
previous lingering conflicts in places like Vietnam (for the U.S,) and Afghanistan 
(for the U.S.S.R.). He demanded that a UN Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) should enhance the involvement of those who previously worked in the 
area (no doubt referring to both Russia and France), because "others" would lack 
the expertise and ability to work with the Iraqis. He even hinted at the quid pro 
quo he expects: Russia would accommodate the U.S., but Washington must 
ensure that Iraq honors its previous commercial contracts, both with Russia and 
others who opposed the war. Apparently, Presidents Putin and Bush were unable 
to come to terms at their recent Camp David summit. President Putin indicates 
Russia won’t even entertain thoughts of sending Russian troops until a UNSCR 
is approved, but, judging by the Bosnian and Kosovo precedents, is it not 
precluded that Russian troops may participate eventually. (RTR and POLIT.RU, 
3 Oct 03 via RFE/RL Newsline Part I, 6 Oct 03; RIA NOVOSTI (en.rian.ru), 6 Oct 
03 The New York Times via russiajournal.com, 6 Oct 03) 
 
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Dept of Defense or the United 
States government. 
 
NAVY 
WMD and non-proliferation — cooperation and joint efforts 
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While the War on Terrorism goes on, non-proliferation efforts continue to curb the 
spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). A myriad of diplomatic, military, 
and regulatory measures coalesced to create the security framework to protect 
the current inventories of WMD allowed for signatories to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Warfare Convention (CWC) and the 
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). In contrast to the previous period and in 
response to the seemingly omnipresent threat of terrorism, this new "world order" 
has presented an image of increased cooperation and joint approaches to non-
proliferation and collective defense. 
 
Consequent to the cooperative biological security efforts with Russia, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the United States and Ukraine have negotiated a 
foundation from which to conduct joint research for protection from biological 
weapons. Nearing final agreement are implementation measures under the aegis 
of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR). According to Brigadier 
General (Ret.) Thomas Kuenning, Director of the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the aim of the CTR Program 
is to install the measures necessary to "safeguard Ukrainian biological materials 
and facilities that pose a potential threat as weapons of mass destruction" (ITAR-
TASS, 29 Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0929 via World News Connection). 
 
In addition to U.S. initiatives with Russia and the CIS, Germany has invested 
both significant capital and technology in non-proliferation protocols with Russia. 
Recently, a delegation from the German Defense Ministry and other federal 
agencies visited the chemical weapons disposal plant in Gorny, in the Saratov 
region. The premise of this consortium of German and Russian agencies is "to 
study and monitor the implementation of the projects aimed at eliminating 
chemical weapons, storing and disposing of hazardous waste." (ITAR-TASS, 29 
Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-0929 via World News Connection) The Gorny plant came on 
line in December 2002 and has been instrumental in diminishing chemical 
weapons stockpiles of yperite and lewisite. Further construction continues at 
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Gorny with a complex for burial of solid waste planned. All in all, Gorny is meant 
as a symbol of international cooperation in combating the transfer of inventory 
and the spread of chemical weapons. It's output will be vital in Russia's ability to 
"scrap 20 percent of its store of chemical weapons under a federal program and 
an international convention by 2007." (ITAR-TASS, 29 Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-0929 
via World News Connection) 
 
On the nuclear issue, U.S. and Russian scientists are attempting to initiate 
cooperative efforts aimed at stemming the tide of potential nuclear terrorism. 
According to Gennadi Mesyats, Vice President of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences, "joint projects are being implemented by the working group for 
countering radiological terrorism, which was created by the academies of 
sciences of the two countries...similar groups were created for countering 
computer terrorism and urban terrorism." (ITAR-TASS, 24 Sep 03: FBIS-SOV-
0925 via World News Connection) At the 2nd International Conference on 
Nonproliferation, UN Under Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, 
Nobuyasu Abe proclaimed that "the U.S. and Russia as two powers, bear a 
special responsibility for strengthening the WMD nonproliferation regime…. 
These two countries have made considerable progress, having signed the 
Moscow Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. However, we would like to have more 
actions...(relating) to the implementation of the program on the reduction of a 
universal threat and global partnership against the proliferation of arms and mass 
destruction materials." (ITAR-TASS, 19 Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-0919 via World News 
Connection) 
 
It is clear that the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction is more complex 
than just their intended use - their storage and that of their nuclear byproducts is 
of equal concern. A recent focus of admittedly contentious reporting is the 
possibility that Russian Navy personnel recently was exposed to potentially high 
doses of radiation at a base in the Northern Fleet. 
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The Bellona Foundation, a Norwegian environmentalist group, recently released 
a statement claiming that several seamen working on a nuclear reactor were 
exposed to high doses of radiation. According to Bellona, "ten enlisted men in the 
Northern Fleet, handling a nuclear reactor in early September, were exposed to 
intense hard radiation. This happened in Gremikha, the technical base of the 
Northern Federal Enterprise for Handling Radioactive Waste [a structure of the 
federal Nuclear Energy Ministry]" (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 25 Sep 03; via ISI 
Emerging Markets database) Gremikha Base Director Valeri Panteleev supports 
the Bellona Foundations claim. Panteleev claims that the Navy and the Nuclear 
Energy Ministry lacked specific knowledge of where on the base radioactive 
waste was located. From all accounts, it appears that "in mid-July this year, while 
digging, some personnel at the base struck a waste burial site and were exposed 
to hard radiation. The doses they received amounted to the average annual 
dose." (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 25 Sep 03; via ISI Emerging Markets 
database). 
 
In a rather scathing analysis, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (25 Sep 03; via ISI Emerging 
Markets database), complains that "all through the 1990s, senior officers of the 
12th Main Directorate of the Defense Ministry [security of nuclear weapons and 
all sorts of nuclear components] repeated over and over that all radioactive 
substances and elements were monitored and under control, that the sites were 
absolutely secure. We see now that radioactive substances were simply dumped 
and forgotten." 
 
That remains to be seen. To this end, really genuine international collaboration 
and cooperation on all aspects of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons 
security would be prudent and potentially valuable instruments in preventing the 
proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
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By Elena Selyuk 
 
UKRAINE 
Much ado about nothing 
On September 19, 2003, at the CIS summit in Yalta, the Presidents of Ukraine, 
Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan signed an agreement on the formation of a 
Single Economic Space (SES). The agreement envisages "unification of the 
customs territories of the states, in which the same economic mechanisms will 
function to ensure free movement of goods, services, assets and labor. The 
member states will pursue the same foreign trade, taxation and monetary, 
crediting and foreign exchange policy." (ITAR-TASS, 22 Sep 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
The President of Belarus, Aleksandr Lukashenka, stated that the agreement 
would solve 90%-95% of Belarussian economic problems. 
(WWW.BELARUSTODAY.INFO, 20 Sep 03) He also expressed his hopes that 
the economic union would bring Belarus and Ukraine in to closer cooperation. 
 
Compared to Belarus', Ukraine's chances of benefiting from this treaty are 
significantly smaller. Even the act of signing the agreement has generated 
controversy in Ukraine. Yuliya Tymoshenko, the leader of the Fatherland Party, 
appealed to the international community not to recognize the signature of Leonid 
Kuchma on any international documents. The party started a new stage in its 
campaign to impeach the president. (BBC MONITORING, 23 Sep 03 via Lexis-
Nexis) Victor Yushchenko, the leader of Our Ukraine alliance party blok also 
threatened Kuchma with impeachment, claiming that the president had sold out 
Ukraine's sovereignty. Even Kuchma's own ministers (of foreign affairs, 
economics, and justice) opposed the agreement, saying that it harmed the 
economic and political interests of the country. 
 
 23 
The reaction of the Ukrainian opposition and of some current government 
members to signing the accord is well justified. Of all four members, Ukraine has 
the most to lose. 
 
Firstly, the Yalta accord requires all members to synchronize the WTO 
negotiations and join on the same terms, which disadvantages Ukraine 
immensely. Experts agree that of these four countries, Ukraine has progressed 
the farthest in WTO negotiations, with Russia lagging far behind and Belarus not 
even close to membership. Thus, actual accession is very likely to be delayed. In 
addition, a clause in the treaty stipulates that should one SES member decide to 
break away from the agreement and join the WTO separately, it would not be 
able to set conditions for other members. On this issue too, Ukraine will lose. 
Thus, there is a clear interest on the part of Ukraine to join before Russia in order 
to extract import trade concessions from Moscow — for example in sugar 
production. 
 
Secondly, by entering into an economic agreement with Russia, Ukraine also 
jeopardizes its relations with Europe and North America. The U.S. ambassador 
to Ukraine alluded to potential criticism of the treaty: "I think the consequences of 
such steps need to be looked at carefully, in order to see if they accord with 
Ukraine's aspiration to integrate with the Euro-Atlantic Community." Naturally, 
Kiev's rekindling of ties with authoritarian Russia does not please many Western 
commentators. Questions also arise regarding Ukraine's closer integration with 
East or West. The German ambassador to Ukraine, Dietmar Stuedemann, called 
on Ukraine to be more consistent in relations with EU. "We have no clear-cut 
idea of Ukraine's purposes concerning the EU," he said. (UKRAINIAN NEWS 
AGENCY, 23 Sep 03 via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Thus, an already 
remote possibility of Ukraine's accession to the European Union might be put off 
even longer. Should the customs union with Russia enter into force, free trade 
with the EU will become impossible, as it is not feasible for Ukraine to harmonize 
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its tariff policy with the EU and Russia at the same time. (WWW.TOL.CZ, 26 Sep 
03) 
 
Thirdly, cheap Russian energy sources, which Ukraine strives to obtain by 
signing the accord, might turn out to be a mixed blessing. The SES agreement 
speaks of "ensuring non-discriminatory access and an equal level of tariffs for 
several natural monopolies." Yuliya Tymoshenko, nonetheless, noted that tariffs 
and prices were different concepts. Tariffs are set by the state, while prices are 
determined by the market. "There are no monopolies in Russia today on oil and 
gas extraction, and so prices will be set by owners, not the state," she claimed. 
(ZERKALO NEDELI, 20 Sep 03; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis 23 Sep 2003) 
Even if cheap energy were to become accessible, it is not necessarily desirable. 
Cheap energy sources will increase Ukraine's dependency on Russia and will not 
provide incentives for Ukraine to move away from its energy-intensive economy, 
thus stifling the potential competitiveness of its products by stifling new 
technological development. 
 
Finally, the accord contains a provision that introduces a supranational body — 
the SES commission — with the power to influence Ukraine's internal affairs. 
This directly contradicts the Ukrainian constitution, which prohibits surrendering 
Ukraine's sovereignty to any supranational body. Furthermore, decisions within 
the commission will be taken by a majority vote, based on economic potential. 
Clearly, the Ukrainian economy does not compare to the Russian economy in 
size, resulting in a potential vote distribution of 9.9% for Ukraine versus 83% for 
Russia. (UNIAN News Agency 22 Sep 03; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
On the other hand, SES is far from being the first endeavor of the CIS members 
to create some sort of economic or political union. Most of these attempts ended 
with words on paper rather than actions. The Eurasian Economic Community 
(EuAsEC), for example, was formed less than three years before the current 
treaty, in October of 2000 by five countries — Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
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Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, with Moldova, Ukraine, and Armenia having observer 
status. Defining a common stance at negotiations on entry to the WTO, 
establishing a free-trade zone, creating a common customs, transport and 
energy space were some of the goals of this accord - goals, very much like those 
of the SES. Creation of an almost identical organization (SES) would have been 
redundant, had the EuAsEC been successful in implementing its aims. 
 
The Russian-Belarussian union likewise is struggling to get off the ground. The 
introduction of the non-cash Russian ruble, initially planned for October 1, 2003, 
was recently postponed in Belarus. The CIS itself has become a largely 
bureaucratic body, that implements only a fraction of all signed documents. 
 
Another likely drag on the efficacy of the accord is an "out" clause, which gives 
any member state the option of not participating at any stage of the treaty. It is 
already becoming clear that Kiev might be interested only in the free-trade zone 
and not the customs union. President Kuchma himself has voiced doubt that the 
national parliament would ratify the SES accord. (ITAR-TASS 30 Sep 03 via 
Lexis-Nexis) 
 
The question arises — why sign an agreement, which is already harming Ukraine 
politically and could potentially harm it economically? The answer might be that 
Kuchma is desperately seeking the Kremlin's political support before the 
upcoming presidential elections. In fact, President Putin himself hinted at a 
recent press conference that "Kuchma's bitter rivals" are queuing up for Russian 
approval. (WWW.TOL.CZ, 26 Sep 03) And who could doubt the choice Kuchma 
would make between the well being of the country and his own political security? 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Ariela Shapiro 
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GEORGIA 
In the past month, energy security has dictated much of U.S. and Russian foreign 
policies toward the South Caucasus, and in particular toward Azerbaijan and 
Georgia. In Georgia, on 27 September, the Assistant Coordinator of the U.S. 
Department of State announced that future U.S. aid to Georgia is to be reduced 
by a quarter, from about $110m to about $77m. (SARKE DAILY, 27 Sep 03 via 
ISI Emerging Databases) These funds would have aided both the Ministries of 
Finance and of Fuel & Energy. The catalyst for the U.S. declaration became clear 
on 30 September, when Georgian President Shevardnadze announced that his 
government had signed a 25-year contract with Russia’s Gazeksport, a 
subsidiary of Gazprom, to begin delivery of gas to Georgia on 15 October 
(SARKE DAILY, 2 Oct 03 via ISI Emerging Databases). At present, Georgia’s 
three gas suppliers are Azerbaijan, via the soon-to-be-functional Baku-Tbilisi-
Erzurum pipeline (KAVKASIA-PRESS, Oct 1 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1001 via World 
News Connection), and the Russian energy companies: Itera and Gazprom. This 
new venture will allow the Russian government, which owns the controlling stock 
of Gazprom (KAVKASIA-PRESS, 27 Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0927 via World 
News Connection), the ability to transport Iranian gas to Europe and Russia via 
the South Caucasian transit route, mainly through Georgia and Armenia. In 
exchange for giving Russia control of Georgia’s energy markets, the United 
States has staked its claim in the Azerbaijan oil sectors (addressed in detail later 
in the report). 
 
By ceding control over Georgia’s energy sector, the United States may have 
hastened the end of GUUAM, the cooperative alliance of Georgia, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, while indirectly promoting a Russian 
dominated CIS communal economic zone. Not coincidentally, at the recent CIS 
summit in Yalta, the presidents of Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan 
signed an agreement for the creation of a "CIS Free Economic Zone." 
(GEORGIAN RADIO, 22 Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0922 via World News 
Connection). Although Georgia was not a signatory, it is considering bilateral 
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cooperation with the free trade zone. (BBC Monitoring, 22 Sep 03; via Lexis-
Nexis) 
 
Georgia’s future economic integration, along with the Abkhazian issue, are sure 
to be the most debated issues in the upcoming 2 November parliamentary 
elections, in which nine political blocs are registered to participate. 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
On 2 October, the withdrawal of Heidar Aliev from the October 15 presidential 
elections was announced, and his son Ilham Aliev was named as the sole 
candidate of the regime's Yeni Azerbaijan Party. (Associated Press, 2 Oct 03 via 
Lexis-Nexis) This move proved helpful to obtaining American support and 
continuing economic involvement in Azerbaijan, while also signifying a potential 
for more political openness in what had been viewed widely as the corrupt and 
autocratic Aliev regime. 
 
The U.S. interest in keeping either Heidar or Ilham Aliev in Baku was stated even 
before Heidar Aliev stepped down, as indicated by President Bush's letter of 
congratulations to Ilham Aliev on his appointment as prime minister (Associated 
Press, 2 Oct, 03 via Lexis-Nexis), and also in meeting Aliev at a party arranged 
for the 58th UN Summit Conference. (Financial Times Information, 24 Sep, 03 
via Lexis-Nexis) The United States is concerned with the continuity of power in 
Azerbaijan, prevention of Russian and Iranian meddling, construction of the 
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, and stability for American and international energy 
investors. These short-term goals outweigh the constant barrage of media 
reports emanating from Azerbaijani and international media sources regarding 
the tough methods used by the current Aliev government against opposition 
candidates. (Baku Tehran, 22 Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0922 via World News 
Connection; Baku Tehran, 23 Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0923 via Lexis-Nexis; 
BBC Monitoring, 2 Oct 03 via Lexis-Nexis) These interests also eclipse the 
recent bribery allegations surrounding attempts to privatize the Azeri oil company 
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Socar, in which both Heidar Aliev and Ilham Aliev are implicated. (Energy 
Intelligence Group, Inc, 16 Sep 03 via Lexis-Nexis) In one incident to date, 
Washington succumbed to pressure from the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly 
sufficiently to indicate at least a desire to see "free and open elections" in 
Azerbaijan. (Baku Tehran, 23 Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0923; via World News 
Connection) 
 
Ilham Aliev appears more concerned with maintaining solid economic relations 
with the West then sustaining the autocratic system his father created, perhaps 
because of his background as a senior executive of Socar (Energy Intelligence 
Group, 2 Oct 03 via Lexis-Nexis), his current connections with American and 
European companies, such as Omega Advisors and Oily Rock (United Press 
International, 24 Sep 03 via Lexis-Nexis) and statements by former business 
associates in Socar. (Energy Intelligence Group, 2 Oct 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
Granted, the elections will not be completely open or free, but the current 
environment does indicate signs of greater political openness in the areas of 
media and political competition. 
 
In addition to American support, Ilham Aliev recently met with Russian President 
Vladmir Putin at the Yalta CIS Summit, at which time Putin indicated support of 
Ilham Aliev as a successor to Heidar Aliev. (Associated Press, 18 Sep 03 via 
Lexis-Nexis) Russian and Azerbaijani bilateral trade has increased precipitously 
in the past few years, 70% in 2002 and 20% in the first five months of 2003 
(Interfax, 18 Sep 03; Associated Press via Lexis-Nexis), indicating a deepening 
of relations between the two countries. This extension of ties validates the notion 
that GUUAM has ceased to be a working mechanism while indicating also that 
the existing rivalry over South Caucasian energy sources between the United 
States and Russia may soon center on Azerbaijan. 
 
CHECHNYA 
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The 6 October 2003 Chechen elections represent Moscow’s desire to appear as 
separating itself politically from the Chechen quagmire. In Moscow’s desperate 
effort to portray the Chechen situation as stable and fully capable of building a 
working democratic apparatus and policy making structure, every endeavor was 
made to provide the 6 October elections with all the "proper" democratic 
trappings. These included the distribution, to over 600,000 Chechens, of proper 
forms of identification (in the form of Russian passports) to enable them to vote 
(Financial Times, 27 Sep 03; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis) as well as the 
closure of Ingushetian refugee camps (which held an estimated 10,000 refugees) 
by the Interior Ministry (Agence France Presse, 1 Oct 03 via Lexis-Nexis) to give 
the refugees greater access to the polls and to preempt international critique for 
preventing proper electoral representation for the Chechen refugee population. 
 
However, the measures are more clearly indicative of a larger Russian objective, 
to cloak the republic in a security blanket, and thus ensure the absence of foreign 
observers and prevent escape for Chechen citizens living in the republic. The 
military forces, which consist of the FSB, the Defense Ministry (via GRU units), 
the Interior Ministry and the Chechen Internal Police force, sprang into action in 
the week before the election in a series of movements which included the FSB 
strengthening the border between Georgia and Chechnya (ITAR-TASS, 30 SEP, 
03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0930 via World News Connection); and an increased 
presence of both the Interior Ministry and the Internal Chechen Police to "guard 
the polling stations" and "monitor the traffic" around Grozny. (ITAR-TASS, 2 Oct 
03 via Lexis-Nexis) Indeed, there was an armed security guard for every ten 
people eligible to vote on election morning, while estimates place the number of 
Interior Ministry personnel at 5,000 and Chechen Internal Police at 13,500. 
(WHAT THE PAPERS SAY - Russian Political Monitor, 6 Oct 03 via ISI Emerging 
Databases; ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 26 Sep 03 FBIS-SOV-2003-0926 via 
World News Connection) 
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All 30,000 Russian federal forces were allowed to cast their vote while the 
estimated 50,000 Chechen citizens living abroad in Georgia, Russia or 
elsewhere were not provided transportation or access papers to participate in the 
election. (Associated Press, 3 Oct 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Additionally, Kadyrov’s victory in the election was guaranteed before a vote was 
cast by the absence of other viable candidates, such as Malik Saidullayev, 
Aslambek Aslakhanov, and Husein Dzhabrailov, all of whom had been either 
pressured or prevented from participating in the elections by the Moscow or 
Chechen authorities. Thus, the election failed to provide either pluralist 
competition or proper representation of the Chechen political will by "electing" 
Akhmad Kadyrov in an unprecedented 81.1% majority. (New York Times, 6 Oct 
03; What the Papers Say, 6 Oct 03 via ISI Emerging Databases) 
 
International criticism of the election has been pointed, but has avoided the 
denunciation of Kadyrov as the legitimate leader of the Chechen government. 
Among the critics are the U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher 
and NATO's secretary-general designate Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, both of whom 
asserted that the election did not meet international standards. (AGENCE 
FRANCE PRESSE, 6 Oct 03 via ISI Emerging Markets; FINANCIAL TIMES, 7 
Oct 03 via Lexis-Nexis) The Bush-Putin Camp David Summit of 26-27 
September and the U.S. desire for a U.N. mandated military presence in Iraq, 
may explain the relatively subdued U.S. criticism of the Chechen elections. 
 
No bservers were sent by any of the major NGO’s, including the U.N., PACE 
(Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe), or the OSCE because of 
wide skepticism regarding these "elections." However, the Organization of 
Islamic Conference, to which Russia has recently applied to be an observer 
state, the Arab League and CIS countries did send observers. (FINANCIAL 
TIMES, 5 Oct, 03; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis) 
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Thus, in a mockery of the democratic process, which is sure to embitter war-
battered Chechens, Kadyrov has been handed a republic rife with internal 
divisions, powerful interest groups, and a radicalized young Chechen population. 
With few institutional precedents or structures to guide him in ruling the Chechen 
people, he will continue his policy of enforcing the "rule of law" via the machine 
gun and bayonet. Thus, the elections have served to harm the one societal 
element it was supposedly aimed to help — the Chechen populace. Indeed, the 
increased activities of the militants, Kadyrov's low popularity in the republic, and 
massive human rights violations perpetrated by the federal forces and Internal 
Chechen Police will further radicalize Chechens in the republic and beyond, 
inuring them to violence and embittering them with regard to "solutions" forged 
through the so-called democratic process. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By David Montgomery 
 
Political parties, international relations, and defense 
Though some anti-regime activity is brewing, opposition parties in Turkmenistan 
and Kyrgyzstan remain relatively weak. Some groups try to unite to challenge the 
status quo; the U.S. and Russia vie for influence in Central Asia; Kazakhstan 
pushes a multi-vector foreign policy; and Tajikistan reaches out to everyone. One 
factor common to the entire region is military cooperation in preparation for "anti-
terrorism" action. 
 
Surviving a 2002 assassination attempt, Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov 
came down heavily on political opposition groups. On 29 September, the leaders 
of the four most viable opposition entities announced a willingness to join forces 
within the newly-created structure of the Union of Democratic Forces of 
Turkmenistan (UDFT). The ability of the four groups to function as a unified force 
is somewhat questionable and, given that most members of the group remain in 
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exile, the effectiveness of their proposed "democratic" platform is uncertain. 
Akmukhammet Velsapar, a dissident émigré writer, referred to the UDFT as "the 
beginning of the end of the Niyazov regime," whereas poet in exile Shirali 
Nurmukhammet described the UDFT as a "fictitious marriage… [that] won’t last 
long." (EURASIANET, 30 Sep 03 via www.eurasianet.org) Despite the uncertain 
future of UDFT, it does represent the most significant challenge to Niyazov's 
hegemony in recent years. 
 
While there may be discontent with the Niyazov government, the media in 
Turkmenistan remain rigidly controlled by the state and informing the population 
about UDFT may prove difficult. A recent poll in Kyrgyzstan, for example, 
suggests caution about the ability of opposition parties to get out their message: 
of 900 surveyed, over 40 percent were unable to name any of the opposition 
parties, while over 65 percent were unable to name a party they trusted. The 
three most popular parties were: Ar-Namys (Honor) — the party of Felix Kulov, 
the imprisoned former Vice President and Mayor of Bishkek — at 35 percent 
awareness and 17 percent trust; the Communist parties at 25.2 percent 
awareness and 14 percent trust; and the Ata-Meken (Fatherland) party at 24.8 
percent awareness and 14 percent trust (KABAR, 1035 GMT, 3 Oct 03; FBIS-
SOV-2003-1003 via World News Connection; RFE/RL, 6 Oct 03 via 
www.rferl.org). Yet, compared with Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan has a relatively 
high degree of freedom of the press, suggesting the difficulty opposition groups 
face in trying to initiate social change and assert political control. 
 
While groups such as UDFT, Ar-Namys, and Ata-Meken, among others, seek 
leadership roles within the decision-making structure of the state, external forces 
also vie for influence. The jockeying for position of the U.S. and Russia is the 
best contemporary example of Central Asia playing home to "Great Game" 
rivalries. By the end of the month, both countries will have military bases 
operating in Kyrgyzstan and though the presence of U.S. troops is described as 
temporary, until the end of the end of the campaign in Afghanistan, the U.S. 
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undoubtedly will want to continue to assert a role in the region. The Russian 
military will remain in Kyrgyzstan for an indefinite period and is settling in to re-
establish its hegemonic influence over Central Asia. 
 
Central Asian leaders astutely use the interests of other governments to their 
own advantage. Looking to expand markets for its energy resources and gain 
admittance next year to the World Trade Organization, Kazakhstan has a multi-
vector policy of simultaneously engaging China, Russia, and the U.S. 
(EURASIANET, 03 Oct 03, via www.eurasianet.org) Kazakhstan was one of the 
driving forces behind the Almaty-Bishkek-Kashgar-Islamabad-Karachi trade route 
opened 7 October 2003. This will facilitate the transit of automobile shipments by 
issuing a limited number of licenses with unrestricted movement throughout 
Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan-China-Pakistan. (ITAR-TASS, 1607 GMT, 01 Oct 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-1001 via World News Connection) 
 
Tajikistan on the other hand, with its weaker economic base, has been reaching 
out to everyone with a slew of proposals hoping someone will take interest: from 
designating Central Asia a "nuclear free zone" and declaring 2005-2015 the 
"International Fresh Water Decade," to increasing regional railway effectiveness 
and lobbying for a global partnership to combat the drug trade. (ITAR-TASS, 
0918 GMT, 03 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1003; 1752 GMT, 1329 GMT, 1802 
GMT, 30 Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0930 via World News Connection) 
 
While the various countries of Central Asia confront internal opposition and court 
lucrative trans-national trade relations, one issue upon which they seem able to 
agree and work together is the defense front. For the most part, the various 
administrations have cooperated in their anti-terrorism efforts, even when some 
aspects of this approach clearly have been politically motivated, e.g. the 
proposed shift of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Regional Anti-
terrorism Center from Bishkek to Tashkent. (see NIS Observed, 10 Sep 03) 
Kyrgyzstan recently held exercises of the Collective Rapid Deployment Force, 
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which may double its number of troops over the next few months. (ITAR-TASS, 
1118 GMT, 26 Sep 03; 1255 GMT, 25 Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0926 via World 
News Connection) Kazakhstan has called for the creation of a center to foster 
preventive diplomacy and to counteract conflict in Central Asia. The center, 
which would be based in Almaty, in essence would serve as a conduit for UN 
peace and security initiatives in the region. (ITAR-TASS, 0618 GMT, 26 Sep 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0926 via World News Connection) And NATO, wanting to 
continue working with Uzbekistan on defense reforms, also has expressed 
readiness to begin working with Turkmenistan on the Partnership for Peace 
program. (ITAR-TASS, 0458 GMT, 26 Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0926; 1319 
GMT, 29 Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0929, via World News Connection) 
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